

3 October 1967

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SOVIET UNION


Military:

Could spend several hours as we do annually with numerous Cong. committees on Sov/Chinese military posture, but will limit to highlights and latest significant developments.

I. Present controversy over ABM defense reflects concern over emerging shape of ICBM threat to U.S.

A. Pace at which Soviets deploying 3rd generation ~~just about almost~~ missiles indicates they can/match us in number ICBM of/launchers in next 18 to 24 months.--  $\pm 1,000$ .

1. They are starting production of a POLARIS-type submarine



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2. Deployment emphasizes dispersal and hardening.


From our point of view, SAC targets are being increased geometrically, and 80% of finished force will be in silos.

3. Over half of ICBM force will consist of SS-11-- missile with relatively smaller warhead, lower accuracy, obviously designed as city-buster rather than weapon against hardened military targets.

B. Soviets are increasing survivability by  
deployment of ABM system

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C. Significance is that Soviets are bound to have increasing confidence in their "assured destruction capability"---which heightens the risks inherent in brinksmanship even if we dont expect that even over next 10 years they would be confident enough to consider deliberate initiation of global thermonuclear war.

largest

1. Soviets are making their ~~greatest~~ defense expenditures in history, to make sure they lose no ground in current balance of forces, and if possible to find some technological breakthrough which might swing balance in their favor.

~~20+19.8 Billion Rubles  
(@) \$65 million  
15% US prices  
Up another 5%  
next year~~

II. Leadership: Present Kremlin leadership, since dumping Khrushchev, has worked out what serves as a decision-making process, apparently but/centers on a "don't rock the boat" approach. Decisions on gut issues are postponed or compromised.

A. There is a crying need, for instance, for hard decisions on allocation of critical resources.

1. This would involve choice between demands of military--who were strongly opposed to what they considered short-changing by Khrushchev-- and obvious needs of agriculture-----to say nothing of the investment required to get the GNP growth rate out of its doldrums, or the probable feeling of the Soviet man-in-the-street that his payoff ought to be a bit bigger after , 50 years of Communism.
2. Under the present modus operandi, the Kremlin gives everybody a priority--and as a result, USSR is almost through second year of the current 5-year period, and a Five Year Plan has yet to be approved.

III. Decision-making process is collective in fact as well as appearance, which spreads the responsibility, tends to inhibit rash adventures, but also tends to inhibit necessary changes.

- A. The leadership obviously hopes to avoid a return to one-man rule, and Brezhnev at present at most is first among equals,
- B. But there are continuing controversies behind the scenes, continuing factionalism, and consequently a continuing drift toward one-man rule--which is, after all, the only set-up which seems natural and comfortable to men who grew up under Lenin and Stalin.

C. So far, the collective leadership which ousted Khrushchev has hung together and worked out its operating procedures, but it has yet to demonstrate that it can both make the hard decisions, and prevent return to one-man-rule.

IV. Foreign Policy:

This Kremlin rule-by-committee in no sense implies any weakening of the major thrust of Soviet foreign policy, which continues to center on the expansion of Russian influence beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.

- A. The Cold War did not end with the Cuban missile crisis, the fall of Khrushchev, the nuclear test ban treaty, or the Sino-Soviet dispute.
- B. Rather, the Cold War has changed its character and its tactics. It is more political, more subtle, more gradual. The goals remain the same.
- C. The low-keyed style of Brezhnev and Kosygin, in fact, is probably better suited to the Cold War and the nuclear stalemate, as they now stand, than the flamboyance of Khrushchev.

- D. The present Soviet leadership still starts with dogmatic attitude that the world should conform to the Soviet image of it, but for the first time in decades the Kremlin appears to realize that there are some international events and global facts of life that just can't be hammered into this mold.
  - 1. In other words, their foreign policy shows that they have begun to have a grasp of their limitations. - *More Pragma than dogma*
  - 2. This could have started with the Cuban setback.
    - They can no longer dictate to former EE "satellites"
    - shock of Sino-Soviet dispute
    - defiance by Castro
    - recent Arab fiasco
  - 3 Dogma and Pragma clash head-on over Vietnam.
    - Communist brother v capitalist-imperialist.
    - Glad to see US bogged down.*
    - Support of Vietnam helped isolate China, get Sovs out of corner K painted them into.
    - Now can't afford to be tagged "appeasers," probably can't pressure Hanoi anyway.
    - But its not as vital Soviet interest as Europe, East-West trade, even arms control.
    - They say US-USSR bilaterals can't improve during Vietnam, but civil air, MR peaceful

4. Clearly want to keep lines of commo to Wash open so can resume dialogue ~~on~~ for progress on meaningful issues.

Sino-Soviet dispute

V. Relations rockbottom. Trade slumping, agreements shipping incidents canceled, abuse of diplomats, public vituperation.

Can't see improvement under present leaderships.


A. Both building record re Vietnam for blame for final break.

1. Chinese trying make Sovs stop by sea, face US Navy.
2. North Viets now take title at Soviet border.
3. Hanoi kept hopping to keep out of line of fire, maintain good relations with both.
4. Even affected Sino-Soviet frontier.
5. Soviets obviously concerned over what they can't control.

CHINA

I. Chinese military establishment, in a nutshell, claims world's largest ground force, third largest air force, fourth largest submarine fleet, but it's a sub-standard World War II military machine that can not overrun its mainland neighbors if it ~~encounters~~ significant opposition from major power.


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II. But that's only part of picture. On top of this limited and outdated military capability, Chinese have superimposed, entirely on their own, a menacing capability in advanced weapons.

A. Demonstrated they can build both fission and thermonuclear weapons.


B. Medium range ballistic missile



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C. Could have ICBM ready for testing soon, capable of putting satellite into orbit. Could have limited IOC ICBM  in early 1970's.

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IV. This advanced weapons development, however, is about the only progress that has been made in China over the past few years. It has been accomplished only by overriding priorities, and by what must have taken superhuman efforts to shield the necessary activity from the present domestic turmoil.

China has been rocked for a year and a half now by the convulsions Peking calls the Cultural Revolution.

*Pages 5-18)*  
*Draft*  *Bugfix*

Condense

The Cultural Revolution

I. Communist China has been rocked for the past year and a half by the convulsions which Peking calls the Cultural Revolution.

A. In the summer of 1966, Mao Tse-tung launched a campaign designed to ensure that China--during Mao's remaining years and after his death--would remain on a radical and revolutionary course.

1. These terms are relative. You might say that--from Mao's viewpoint--the Soviets with their matured revolution, their advanced economy, and their international line of co-existence, had turned stodgy and conservative. Mao was concerned that the same thing might be happening to the Chinese leadership around him, after nearly two decades in power.

2. His purge was aimed directly at the Communist Party leadership, and the party bosses in the provinces.

3. The Communist Party was hardly an effective instrument to purge itself, so he created the Red Guards.

B. The men Mao was gunning for did not surrender tamely. They organized their own mobs, which also called themselves Red Guards and claimed to be working for the Cultural Revolution. They incited workers in some cases to attack the Red Guards. They sought and sometimes got the support of local military commanders.

C. There is ample evidence that the Red Guards, once they had been created, engendered their own momentum and picked their own targets. They proved difficult if not impossible to control.

D. What might be called a "third force" seems to be taking shape, probably centered around Premier Chou En-lai and composed of government ministers and military commanders.

1. These men are concerned over the growing chaos and disruption, concerned over their own security and status, and outraged over the excesses and irresponsibility of the Red Guards.

TOP SECRET

E. Twice this year--in January and again in August--they seem to have brought enough pressure to bear on Mao and his designated Number Two Man, Marshal Lin Piao, to bring about the temporary moderation of the Cultural Revolution.

II. But in spite of the efforts for moderation, China is in its most serious crisis since the Communists took control of the mainland in 1949. This summer there have been reports of violent conflict from every province of China.

A. Groups of fanatic Red Guard extremists are engaged in pitched battle with one another, and with organized workers.

1. Casualty figures indicate that the death toll in large cities runs into the thousands. Hospitals are said to be filled with wounded Red Guards and workers.

B. For the first time in the Cultural Revolution, regular military weapons--including tanks and artillery--are being used on a wide scale.

C. [redacted] local authorities have been trying to recover these weapons, but with only limited success.

1. Most Red Guard factions are unwilling to

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render themselves defenseless by surrendering arms.

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- D. The economy is beginning to feel the pressure.
  - 1. Trains run haphazardly. There have been serious disruptions in rail and river transport all over the country for many weeks.
  - 2. Key industrial centers have suffered sporadic shut-downs, and such reports are growing in volume and frequency.
  - 3. One directive, issued in September in the frantic effort to maintain production, urged workers in industry to participate in Cultural Revolution activities in the evenings, but noted that "it is forbidden to make revolution during working hours."

The Role of the "People's Liberation Army"

III. In the course of the Cultural Revolution, the army has not come down with cohesive and unmistakable force on either side.

A. Early in the purge, Marshal Lin Piao was proclaimed as Mao's closest associate and chosen successor.

1. It has been clear, however, that the armed forces--and even the military leadership--have been less than monolithic in their loyalty to Mao and Lin Piao.

2. It appears inconceivable that Mao and the men around him--if they were sure of the army's reliability--would not have called on it earlier to crush provincial resistance.

3. The Red Guard denunciations have reached high into the military commands.

B. The army, always a political force in Communist China, has been called on increasingly to restore order, provide administration, and keep the economy operating. In this respect, it is working with the forces for moderation.


C. Since January, the Chinese Communist Party's administrative apparatus has been discredited and largely dissolved. It can no longer play its former central role in the day-to-day governing of the country.

1. In addition, the upper levels of the governmental apparatus have in large measure been paralyzed by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, producing something of an administrative vacuum.
2. As a result the army has been forced to take over the administration of large areas of China. In March, Lin Piao said that the army had taken over the administration of 7,000 "units." He said this required the use of 30 battalions and divisions in administrative roles.

3. Since March the army's administrative tasks have expanded further. Still more troops have been diverted to these additional tasks.
- D. In its expanded administrative role, the army has found itself at times in conflict with the more militant Red Guard groups.
  1. This was particularly true in February and March, when the military clamped down on Red Guard activity in the name of order and rationality.
  2. Although the army was ordered in April to "support" the militant leftists, the earlier crackdown on the Red Guards left a legacy of resentment. Many local military commanders have been accused by the militants of "suppressing revolutionaries."
- E. The increasing involvement in local political struggles has gradually forced army commanders to abandon the position they first sought to maintain of being "above the battle."


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1. In order to counter pressures from the most militant Mao supporters, local army commanders appear to have encouraged and supported locally-oriented Red Guard groups which have been fighting the left-wingers.



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3. Nevertheless, the army has shown considerable distaste for further involvement in the local political infighting.



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IV. The dissatisfaction of the men around Mao over army opposition to the more extreme "revolutionary" policies came to a head in late July, in a serious confrontation between the Peking Maoists and the powerful commander of the Wuhan Military Region. This "incident" was followed by a nationwide propaganda campaign against unnamed dissident military leaders.

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A. Two important emissaries from Peking were detained from July 20th to 22nd by worker groups responsive to the Wuhan Military Region commander.

1. Peking reacted with a violent campaign against the dissident commander, and the Wuhan command was reorganized.
2. Military leaders who had been running Hupeh province in the Wuhan Military Region were also replaced, as were the military leaders in the adjacent provinces of Honan, Hunan and Kiangsi.
3. On July 22nd, Mao's wife made an inflammatory speech denouncing the Wuhan commander, and instructing Red Guards everywhere to acquire arms in "self defense."

B. Violent conflicts soon broke out in nearly every province between Red Guard groups incited by Peking, and workers organized and responsive to local military commanders.

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
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v. In September, Maoist leaders abruptly retreated, and began conciliatory moves designed to patch up their differences with the army.

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C. Even Mao's wife, in a sharp turn-about, was required to warn against attacks on army leaders, saying that such attacks had caused grave dissatisfaction in military circles.

D. These new moves indicate considerable concern in Peking about the morale and reliability of the military establishment.

E. It is not yet clear whether this is a tactical retreat by Peking, or a major turning point in the Cultural Revolution.

VI. Mao and his associates are still committed to the aims of the Cultural Revolution, but they cannot push it without the support or acquiescence of the army--the ultimate instrument of political control in China.

A. There is little question that if Mao and company do not call off or moderate their Revolution--which they would be most reluctant to do--the result will be greater chaos, and perhaps a state of complete anarchy.

B. Beyond this, it is impossible to predict the outcome of the crisis with any confidence.

C. One possibility is that the situation might be resolved by fragmentation of China into a number of independent regions.

1. This would leave China far from stability, even after new political organizations were set up. In all likelihood, it would mean a repetition of China's history during the 1920s, when warlords contended for power and the people suffered.
- D. A somewhat more likely possibility is that the amorphous elements which have so far been pushing for moderation without taking sides would develop into an organized opposition to Mao, and force him to drop the more extreme objectives of his Cultural Revolution.
  1. The establishment of such an opposition would be a desperate and risky business, requiring a nearly unanimous decision by a large body of powerful and ambitious men if civil war is to be avoided.
  2. There would probably have to be new and more serious domestic problems to drive the military and the moderates to act.

3. The upcoming fall harvest, and the crucial distribution time immediately following, might be a time when such problems could develop.

VII. Even if the forces of moderation come out on top, there is no sign whatever that Peking's unremitting hostility toward the United States would change.

A. Both the wild-eyed fanatics around Mao and the relatively moderate leaders opposed to him are dedicated, hard-line Communists who believe that the U.S. is China's Number One enemy.

VIETNAM

Since American combat troops went in in middle of 1965,

--we have taken initiative away from Communists as far as main combat forces are concerned

--we have prevented them from massing to launch an offensive

--we have inflicted heavy casualties:

KIA
1966, 56,000
7mo '67 - 54,000

~~Communists KIA, 20,000 defected.~~

*Detected  
1966: 20,000  
'67 to date: 20,000+*  
*Yet current Order of Battle credits enemy with more  
than ever more than 300,000, including 141,170 men  
about a quarter of a million men still about  
a main combat force of  
about 120,000,  
operating under eight division headquarters, with 2225*

North Vietnamese and 12 Viet Cong regiments.

Indications are that Communist command--exercised almost completely by identified North Vietnamese generals-- has decided it is too costly as a general rule to fight major military engagements against superior allied fire power and close air support.

But--as they have around DMZ--they will still put together major concentrations whenever they feel that the target, the

weather, the strategic/tactical situation, or our own dispositions justify the risk.

Otherwise, they will re-emphasize classic guerrilla warfare--and in particular they will probably try to concentrate on smashing the pacification elements. Security for the job of the rural development teams is becoming a full-time job for the South Vietnamese Army.

One general summary can be applied to the fighting, the pacification, and the political situation in South Vietnam. There are encouraging aspects, but there are no easy solutions, and there is a long, long way to go.

As for negotiation prospects, Hanoi still takes the basic stand that we must cease all bombing in order to find out what their answer may be, and their leading spokesmen still insist that any settlement must be on the basis of Hanoi's Four Points, which stipulate the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, and a voice for the NFL in the government of South Vietnam.

As far as we can tell, Hanoi probably recognizes that it cannot win in the South by force of arms or by terrorism, but is counting on war-weariness in the U.S., and the pressure of world public opinion, to take the U.S. out of the war.

#### THAILAND

Thailand is paying for its pro-Western stance by increasing incidence of guerrilla warfare--now running about an incident a day, and widespread.

Thais have been trained in counter-insurgency, and

they believe they have started suppressive operations and civic action early enough to handle the job themselves with no more help from us than occasional helicopter lift.

They may be right, but there are many remote regions where there is little government presence, little government loyalty. Guerrillas do not get much support from the people, ~~but~~ but they are getting increasing support from China and North Vietnam.

LAOS

The fighting in Laos doesn't hit the headlines, but it continues: more than 1,600 engagements in 1966. RLG and Meo guerrillas make a little headway in rainy season, lose it again to North Vietnamese in dry season. There are some 18,000 North Vietnamese troops--plus or minus depending on season--in Laos, holding half the country. Main task is to hold and operate Ho Chi Minh corridor.

CAMBODIA

Prince Sihanouk believes that over the long run the Communists--and Peking in particular--are going to dominate Southeast Asia. His main aim therefore is to take out insurance both for his own future and that of his country. He has recently obtained assurances from the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong that they will respect the integrity of Cambodia within the borders claimed by Cambodia.

Sihanouk's thinking is also conditioned by historic hostility between Cambodia on one hand, Thailand and Vietnam on other

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[Redacted]

Evidence is that Sihanouk is opposed to Viet Cong operational use of Cambodian territory for refuge, regrouping, and logistics, but he does not have control over much of the border area and is powerless to prevent violations.

#### INDONESIA

Until recently, 100,000,000 Indonesians, with extensive potential resources and important strategic geography, were sliding surely into grasp of Peking, thanks to a strong Communist party tolerated by Sukarno out of his conviction Chinese Communism was wave of future.

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Badly timed, bungled, and unnecessary coup attempt gave army leaders a chance to turn the tables. Today Indonesian Communists are shattered, and General Suharto has almost completed delicate and time-consuming job of taking away all of Sukarno's power.

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But Indonesia is to all intents and purposes bankrupt and prostrate economically. It owes more than \$2.5 billion, East and West. Just to put economy on a survival basis will take years of careful planning, tight control, international cooperation on re-scheduling debts, and heavy infusions of financial help.

INDIA

Congress Party down to thinnest parliamentary edge since independence; majority control in only 7 of 17 state governments.

Continuing drought, inability to raise agricultural production, mean India will need massive food imports for at least next several years. (Suez closure, Calcutta disorders may combine to produce actual famine conditions temporarily in scattered localities in immediate future.)

Externally, apprehensive re Chinese on Himalayan frontier, no progress toward solution of Kashmir and other disputes with Pakistan.

PAKISTAN

Ayoub, since he dismissed his pro-Peking Foreign Minister, has made a few limited moves to repair his relations with U.S., but they will remain conditioned by Pakistani view that we left them down during fighting with India. *Needs China for weapons, US for Ee Aid, Moscow because of Nasir-Pakistan relap.*

IRAN

The Shah of Iran was also shaken by the way arms aid to Pakistan was cut off during the Kashmir fighting. He is convinced that Nasir and radical Arab States have designs on Iran around the Persian Gulf, and has been wondering if he, too, shouldn't diversify his arms sources.

As a result, he arranged a deal for about \$110 million in military hardware from the Soviet Union, and expanded economic relations with the Communist Bloc as well.




Iran has ~~now~~ worked out a long-term deal under which the Soviet Union is to build pipelines for natural gas, now being burned off at Iranian wells; the pipelines are to be paid for by export of natural gas, which is also to finance a list of industrial aid projects.

#### TURKEY

Pakistan, Iran and Turkey form the so-called "Northern Tier," which--first in Bagdad Pact and then in CENTO--~~was supposed to~~ to screen the turbulent Middle East from the Communist bloc. Like Pakistan and Iran, however, Turkey is also seeking to improve relations with the Communists in an effort to achieve more leverage and greater independence.

In Turkey's case, Cyprus plays the role Kashmir does for Pakistan--U.S. is damned if it does, damned if it doesn't. Ever since U.S. moved to head off a Greek-Turkish military showdown over Cyprus, our relations with Ankara have been in trouble.

- 1) Turkey has required an extensive review of practically all our bilateral agreements.



5) Kosygin got cool public reception on his ~~recent~~  
*(early in 1967)* state visit to Turkey, but it was the first time  
a Soviet premier had ever visited Turkey. *Demanded*  
*just completed visit to USSR.*

CYPRUS

The Cyprus issue appears to be as far from solution as ever. Quiet Greek-Turkish talks have made some headway from time to time, but they have broken down repeatedly because of Greek government crises which justified Turkish doubts that the Greek negotiator could speak for Greece, let alone sell any agreement to Archbishop Makarios. Makarios for his part tries to undermine any possible Greek-Turkish solution, is trying to develop his own forces independent of Greek command, with weapons from Czechoslovakia.

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


GREECE


Greece itself is the western terminus of the disruption that plagues what was supposed to be the strong NATO-CENTO-SEATO cordon stretched along the periphery

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
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difficult to see how or when the present

regime is going to restore democracy and at the same time preclude a return to that same political threat, given the popular support for the forces around the Papandreous.

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THE MIDDLE EAST

Just as hard as we have been trying to put together a chain of effective alliances along Soviet borders from Greece to Iran, Soviets have been trying to leapfrog that chain and establish themselves in Middle East.

The recent fighting in the Middle East can be attributed almost as much to Soviet support of the Arabs as to the Arab refusal\* to recognize the existence of Israel.

The Soviets armed the Arabs, and the Arabs thought it was enough to have the new weapons, without having the trained men to use them properly and effectively.

The Soviets encouraged the Syrians in their provocations of the Israelis, and then encouraged Nasir to make demonstrative moves in support of the Syrians.

The Soviets and the Arabs both appear to have overlooked and ignored the fact that the Israelis had made it plain that they would consider such moves as the closure of the gulf leading to Eilat a cause for war.

The Arabs were surprised with the Israelis attacked, surprised when the Soviets failed to provide greater support,\* and surprised when the Israelis simply overran them in spite of their marvelous new weapons.

The recent Khartoum summit conference of Arab leaders shows a little bit more realism, but still nowhere nearly enough to suggest that the Arabs have decided they have to get along with Israel.

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(Kinsasa)

The Congo proceeds from one crisis to another.

You can at least say for Mobutu that he has managed to establish some measure of internal control, but he seems to get in trouble about as fast and as often as his predecessors.

He must know that he does not have enough skills and enough education in the country to keep its economy and even day-to-day administration running without foreign help, yet he seems to go out of his way to challenge both the Belgian government, which supplies foreign technicians for everything from banks to water-works and schools, to the Belgian business interests which recruit, pay, and control the Europeans who keep the mines producing.

Now you have this ridiculous situation where 60 to 75 white mercenaries have proclaimed they are going to run the country, and the entire Congolese Army ~~can't drive~~ <sup>took weeks to</sup> them out.

It's a temptation to the West to pull out and let the Congo limp along on its own, but the country is too big and too strategic to let it go by default to the Russians or the Chinese.

Nigeria

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Nigeria, most populous country (50 million) is falling apart without any need for Communist manipulations. British left Nigeria with possibly strongest hope in Africa for stable, intelligent government, economic viability, but religious it has been pulled apart by tribal and [redacted] differences. There are more than 200 separate tribal groupings in Nigeria among the major divisions into Moslem Haussas in the North, Christian Ibos in East, pagan Yorubas in West. Ibos are most advanced, best trained, have oil, but are badly outnumbered, bitterly resented.

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North Africa

North Africa is affected by the division of new African states into radicals and moderates. This rivalry, along with border issues, occasionally brings Algeria close to hostilities with Morocco, and to a lesser extent Tunisia. Algeria receives extensive arms aid from USSR.

The Horn

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has been a force for stability and moderation, but the Emperor is aging, and the succession outlook offers little prospect for continued stability. Ethiopia is plagued by internal dissidence in Eritrea, border warfare with Somalia.

The Somalis are similarly keeping the border with Kenya in a state of unrest, claiming large Somali tribal areas in both Kenya and Ethiopia should be part of Somalia.

Just to keep entire area in a state of unrest, the Sudan is plagued by political instability, and dissidence in the Negro South bordering on civil war.

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